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Puzzles ofIdentity: Binding at the Interface

Johan Rooryck & Guido Vanden Wyngaerd
HIL, RU Leiden & FWO, KU Brussel

1.

Binding and identity"

In the Minimalist Program, derivations yield configurations, which serve as the
input for interpretation at the (conceptual-interpretive) Interface. This view is not
compatible with the traditional view on the Binding Theory, which assumes .the
independent existence of binding principles. We suggest a radical revision of the Binding
Theory, according to which the morphological make-up and configurational position of
anaphors and pronouns alone determine their interpretation (cf. also Safir's 1996 'atoms
of anaphora'). It will be argued that the morphological complexity of anaphors is
mirrored by their semantic complexity: since every element of the complex is interpreted
at the Interface, morphologically complex items receive semantically complex
interpretations.
This view discards the traditional view of binding in terms of referential identity
of individuals 'in the world', to be expressed in terms of coindexing (see also Pica &
Snyder 1997). In the view developed here, individuals are not treated as atomic: we
assume that animate DPs must semantically be viewed as sets of time-slices or stages in
the sense of Carlson (1977). As a consequence, relations of identity between individuals,
such as those expressed by coindexing in traditional binding theory, are not the atoms of
our theory either. We suggest that the interpretation of anaphors involves an operation of
temporal intersection between the time-slices of anaphor and antecedent. Interpretive
differences between simplex and complex anaphors can likewise be expressed in terms of
the temporal interpretation of the identity relation between antecedent and anaphor.
Concretely, we argue that anaphoric linking can be established by different
syntactic configurations. One sort of linking involves an identification of time-slices of
the subject with those of the event expressed by the verb through mediation of the Tense
node. Another type of anaphoric linking relies on the syntax of inalienable possession.
The latter involves a shift from the spatial to the temporal domain: inalienable possession
is spatially interpreted with respect to body-parts, but when applied to sets of time-slices
this relation is interpreted temporally in terms of intersections of sets of time slices,
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which we assume to be the stuff that anaphoric linking is made of. The anaphoric
relationships created by these two mechanisms are different in nature from the anaphoric
relationships created by a mechanism like coindexing, ranging as they do over temporal
slices or sets of temporal slices. For this reason, the evidence that we focus upon is of a
sort which, though occasionally noted in the literature, has always been peripheral to the
formulation of the binding theory. We attribute a central role to this evidence in the
development of our analysis. The evidence shows that several forms of identity are
possible as a function of temporal intersection and (morpho-)syntactic configuration, i.e.
that the traditional concept of identity should be decomposed. This is, in fact, a direct
consequence of the CarIsonian treatment of individuals as sets of time slices, and our
application of that idea to the domain of binding theory.
This paper is a follow up on Rooryck & Vanden Wyngaerd (1998a), and is most
fruitfully read against the background established there. We will, however, briefly
recapitulate the main points of that paper, referring the reader to the earlier paper for
more details and examples. In the present paper, we expand on our explanation for the
different interpretations of Dutch zich and zichzeljin terms of the semantics of time-slices
and morphological complexity, with an eye on addressing the differences between the
anaphoric uses of lui 'hirnlher' and lui-meme 'himself in French. We show that different
syntactic strategies for construing anaphoricity yield different interpretations of
referential identity.

2.

The questions

In nonlocative PP environments, French pronouns such as lui 'him' can function
as anaphors, whereas English pronouns cannot (Zribi-Hertz 1980, Ronat 1982). This
contrast is illustrated iD (la) vs (lb):
(\) a Victoij a honte de luiilj ..
b Victoij is ashamed of him*iljhimselfi/.j.
c Victori a honte de lui-memei/*jThe sentence (Ic) shows that the same PP environment can also host a complex
expression lui-meme with anaphoric properties that appear to be identical to that of the
complex reflexive himselj in English. These sentences immediately raise two questions,
which are summarized in (2):
(2) a Why can French lui, but not English him, have a local antecedent?
b What is the difference between anaphoric lui 'him' and lui-meme 'himself?
In the remainder of this paper, we will try to provide an answer to both questions,
showing that they are related. First of all, we would like to gain a more precise
descriptive understanding of the interpretive difference between anaphoric lui 'him' and
lui-meme 'himself, both of which are possible in environments such as (1). Zribi-Hertz
(1980) describes the difference between (la) and (I c) as follows:
"The example [(Ia)] can describe a situation in which Victor experiences
embarassment upon seeing an old photograph of himself, or upon remembering a
past action: even though Victor; and llli; carry the same referential index, they refer
to two distinct entities in the world (Victor-in-the-flesh looking at the photo or
calling forth remembrances, and Victor-of-the-photo, or of-the-remembrance). [... ]
By contrast, the sentence [(I c)] seems less 'normal' than [(Ia)] to describe the
situation referred to above (old photo or remembrance, which Victor could
'distance' himself from) . The natural interpretation of [(I c)] tends to involve a
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/nels/vol29/iss1/22

2

Rooryck and Wyngaerd: Puzzles of Identity: Binding at the Interface

309

Puzzles ojIdentity

sentiment of Victor with respect to his actual 'self (actions, thoughts, ... )." (ZribiHertz 1980: 162-3; our translation-GVW&JK).
The interpretive differences described by Zribi-Hertz (1980) for French lui 'him' and luimeme 'himself in tenns of temporal interpretation are strongly reminiscent of similar
contrasts between the Dutch simplex and complex anaphors zich and zichze/j. Following
Voskuil & Wehnnann (1990a, 1990b), Rooryck & Vanden Wyngaerd (l998a) observe
that the simplex anaphor zich requires an 'actual', 'simultaneous' reading, and that only
the complex anaphor zichzelj accommodates a 'dissociated' or 'nonsimultaneous'
reading. In (3 a), the context of the video-recording favors a nonsimultaneous
interpretation of the reflexive, hence zichzelj is the preferred option. In (3b), the
difference between zich and zichzelj corresponds to two different situations. In the zich
reading, Noam simultaneously speaks and hears himself through headphones. By
contrast, in the zichzelj reading, he either listens to a temporally dissociated broadcast of
himself:; or he is unaware of his own speech, as when drunk or dreaming or otherwise
dissociated from his usual self.
(3) a Freddy zag ?*zichlzichzelf op de video-opname.
'Freddy saw himself in the video recording.'
b Noam hoorde zichlzichzelf over honkbal praten.
'Noam heard himself talk about baseball.'

(?*simultaneity/dissociation)
(simultaneity/dissociation)

This type of contrast can be reproduced for French, as shown by (4).
(4) a Dorian Gray zag zichzelfl*zich op het schilderij zoals hij eruit gezien zou
moeten hebben.
b Dorian Gray se voyait *?(1ui-meme) dans la peinture tel qu'il aurait dQ etre.
'Dorian Gray saw himself in the picture the way he should have looked'

In Rooryck and Vanden Wyngaerd (1998b), we not only argue that the French equivalent
of simplex zich is se, but also, perhaps more controversially, that the equivalent of the
complex zichzelj is a complex fonn se ... lui-meme. In the present paper, however, we
wish to focus on the interpretive properties of lui-meme in contexts lacking the reflexive
clitic se. A first point to note is that, while the difference between lui 'him' and lui-meme
'himself as in (I) is clearly reminiscent of that between zich and zichze/j, the two cases
are not identical. First of all, the reverse relation seems to obtain between morphological
complexity and interpretation: while simplex zich in Dutch requires simultaneity, in
French simplex lui requires a 'previous self interpretation. Only the complex expression
lui-meme is compatible with simultaneous readings. But the facts are even more
complicated: the sentences in (5) show that lui cannot always be used to refer to a
dissociated selt; and that lui-meme sometimes can be used in such a manner:
(5) a Sophie a reconcilie Victor avec lui-memel*lui.
(dissociated self)
'Sophie has reconciled Victor withldistanced Victor from himself.'
b Victor bavarde avecls'acharne contre lui-memel*lui.
(dissociated self)
'Victor talks to/fights against himself.'
By contrast, the sentence (1 a) suggests that lui can only be used to refer to a temporally
dissociated, previous part of the self. The various interpretations of simplex and complex
anaphors in French and Dutch can be recapitulated as in (6):

Published by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst, 1999
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(6) a ziehlse
b ziehze/flse .. .lui-meme
c lui
d lui-meme

'simultaneous self (3 b)
'dissociated self (3a), (3b), (4)
'previous self (I a)
' actual self (lc)/'dissociated self (5)

Notably the contrast between (\ a) and (5) with respect to lui is intriguing, and suggests
that several forms of dissociation are possible. Looking at these two examples, one can
find a difference in their interpretation that can be cast in terms of temporal subsets: in
(la) lui refers to a past selt; i.e. one that constitutes a subset of the entire Victor; Victor' s
shame does not extend to the present Victor. In (5), on the other hand, the interpretation
necessarily implies that Victor has become reconciled with his entire self, not just his past
self. This in tum suggest that lui refers to a dissociated but partial self (e.g. a past self),
whereas lui-meme can refer to the entire individual. The analysis to be developed below
will account for this contrast.
With this in mind, we can return to the question (2b), and reformulate it as
follows:
(7)

What determines the range of temporal interpretations
of simplex and complex anaphoric expressions in French and Dutch?

In section 3, we briefly recapitulate our analysis of anaphoric ziehlse. In section 4, we
shall argue that the reasons for the anaphoric behavior of the French pronoun lui, as well
as for the correlated restrictions on its interpretation, are to be sought in the syntax of
inalienable possession. In section 5, we shall address the issue of complex anaphoric
expressions. Both in French and Dutch, complex reflexives consist of a pronominal part
(ziehllui) and a Focus marker (zeljlmeme). It will be shown that the different domain of
application of the Focus marker, viz. the anaphor zich in Dutch and the pronoun lui in
French, derives the differences in interpretation between them.
3.

Simultaneity

Part of the answer to the question raised in (7) lies in the linguistic representation
of animate entities in terms of time-slices. In the philosophical and semantic literature, it
is often assumed that individuals are to be viewed as spatio-temporal regions or
'sausages', which are composed of stages or time-slices (cf. Goodman 1951, Quine 1960,
Carlson 1977, Hinrichs 1985). The '(non-)dissociation' effects discussed above are the
result of differences in the way simplex and complex anaphors are temporally identified
with respect to the slices that their antecedents are composed of.
With respect to the spatio-temporal view on individuals, we find that language
encodes a difference between animate and inanimate NPs as regards the representation of
time-slices. For example, subject positions reveal an interpretive difference between
animate and inanimate NPs, as shown in (8) (due to Hoekstra 1991) and (9):
(8) a John (just) stated that empty categories must be properly governed.
b The ECP (*just) stated that empty categories must be properly governed.
(9) a Nixon (just) gave Mailer a book.
(Nixon = 'animate' Agent) (Oehrle 1976)
b Nixon (*just) gave Mailer a book.
(Nixon = 'inanimate' Cause)
c The book (*just) gave Nixon an ulcer.
Animate DPs can function as agentive subjects associated with punctual tense of the
predicate, whereas 'inanimate' causal subjects in the same position seem to stativize the
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/nels/vol29/iss1/22
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predicate. Hoekstra (p.c.) suggests that this contrast can be explained in tenns of temporal
slices if we assume a difference in the linguistic representation of the time-slices
(henceforth T-.slices) of animates and inanimates which is operative at the level of TP.
Subject positions are syntactically characterized by the feature [person] in AGRSIT,
absent in e.g. AGRoP. Rooryck (1998) and Hoekstra (p.c.) furthermore argue that only
animate DPs possess a [person] feature. The apparent [3p] agreement of inanimate NPs is
in fact default agreement triggered by the absence of [person]. We assume that the feature
[person] is the morphosyntactic realization of the set of animate T -slices, informally
represented as {tl ... t2 ... tn} . Both cognitively and linguistically, a distinction between
animate and inanimate entities exists with respect to the passing of time: thus if John
states A today and not-A tomorrow, we still assume he is the same person. But if the ECP
stated A today and not-A in 6 months' time, we would assume either of two things: (i)
there are really two different conditions, ECP-I and ECP-II, or (ii) the ECP is an animate
being, sliceable just like John, and capable of making statements (see Hoekstra 1991).
Concerning (ii), we find that the grammar routinely treats one and the same NP as either
animate or inanimate, depending on the context. Thus the process of animisation may
tum inanimate NPs into sliceable, hence animate NPs. The converse process can be
observed in (9b), where an animate NP is treated as nonsliceable, hence inanimate.
Similarly, animate subjects of individual level predicates are presented as if the factor
time, in the sense of internal temporal progression or sliceability, is inapplicable to them.
The above assumptions allow us to derive the difference between animate and
inanimate DPs in (8) and (9). In Minimalist tenns, the T-slices of animate DPs can be
checked by the feature [person] in AGRs/T, while the T-slices of inanimate DPs cannot.
Via checking, the T-slice of an animate DP that is simultaneous with sentential T 'hooks
up' with that sentential T. This checking allows for punctual tense, and for the
interpretation of the subject as an Agent at the interface. In the absence of such checking,
T cannot be made punctual, and the predicate is stativized, resulting in an interpretation
ofthe subject as a Cause.
This analysis can be applied to the relation between simplex anaphors and their
antecedents. Following Everaert (1986) and Kayne (1988), we represent Dutch zich and
Romance selsi as clitic heads in an unaccusative configuration. Reinterpreting slightly,
we propose that zich is an unaccusative head in T establishing a relation of identity
between a time-slice of an animate DP in SpecAGRslTP, and a time-slice of the activity
expressed in V. Featurewise, zichlse only has an interpretable [person] feature,
representing an animate time-slice simultaneous with its host T. Reflexive zichlse is
represented as in (lOc), where the index T on zichlse should not be taken as an anaphoric
index, but as an indication of the checking of simultaneity:
(lO)a Jan wastlscheertl{ldeedt} zich {aan} .
b Jean se lavelraselhabille.
'John washes/shaves/dresses.'
c [TP DP zich/se-r [vp V top]]

I

{tl .. h ..tT ... t n}
This analysis now derives the temporally ' simultaneous' reading of the simplex anaphors
zichlse noted in (6a) and the corresponding sentences. Another consequence of the
analysis is that reflexive zich in T is only compatible with subjects possessing T-slices,
and with nonstative verbs (see Rooryck & Vanden Wyngaerd 1998a, 1998b for
discussion and examples).

Published by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst, 1999
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'Anaphorization' of pronouns as 'inalienabilization'

Let us now turn our attention to the simplex pronoun lui 'him'. As we have noted
before, this pronoun can be used anaphorically in nonlocative PP contexts as in (la),
whereas its English counterpart him cannot:
(I) a Victol1 a honte de luiifj
b Victofj is ashamed of him'ifj

By contrast, in the context of locative PPs, pronouns can be 'anaphorized'
languages:

In

both

(II) a Victol1 a tire la couverture [PP.LOC Ii luii]
b Victofj drew the blanket [PP-LOC towards himi]

Importantly, a correlation can be observed between the behavior of 'anaphorized'
pronouns as in (1) and (11) and the syntax of inalienable possession in both French and
English. Both in French and English, definite DPs may mark inalienable possession in
specific syntactic contexts (Kayne 1975, Gueron 1985). Interestingly now, in both
languages definite DPs marking inalienable possession share with anaphorized pronouns
a sensitivity to the contrast between nonlocative contexts, as in (12) and (13), and
locative PP contexts as in (14):1
(12) a Victori a leve [np lew doigt ]
'Victor; lifted hiSifj finger.'
b Victofj lifted [np thej/-i finger]
(13) a Victol1 a fait un signe [Pp de laifj tete]
'Victor; made a sign with hiSi head'
b Victofj made a sign [Pp with thej/"i head)'
(14) a Victor a frappe leani [PP-LOC sur lai tete]
b Victor hit Johni [PP-LOC on thei head]

We would like to suggest that this correlation is not a fortuitous one. We argue that the
mechanism responsible for Inalienable Possession in (12) through (14) is the same
mechanism that ensures 'anaphorization' of the pronoun in (I) and (11). Since both the
syntactic mechanisms ensuring Inalienable Possession and 'anaphorization' seem to be
sensitive to the locativelnonlocative constraint, it is not unreasonable to assume that a
single mechanism is responsible for both phenomena 2 This assumption is all the more
1Note that the body parts in (14) only allow for the Inalienable Possession reading. 10 contrast, the definite
DPs in (12) through (13) also have an alienable reading, in which /e doigtlthe finger could refer to the
finger of a stone statue, and /a fete/the head to the head of a puppet This necessarily inalienable reading of
(14) is actually an argument in favor of the analysis advocated here, since the sentences in (II) with
'anaphorized' pronouns also show a strong tendency to exclude the pronominal reading in favor of the
anaphoric reading. Another point worth noting is that not all locative PP contexts in English allow for
Inalienable Possession, even if these contexts accommodate anaphorized pronouns. Compare the following:
i.
a.
Jean, a un chapeau sur la, tete
b.
Jean; a $5 sur lui;
.. John; has a hat on the; head
John; has $5 on him,
On the construction in (ib), see Dechaine, Hoekstra & ROOl:yck (1995).
2 The correlation between anaphorization of the pronoun and inalienabilization of definite DP's observed
for French and English at first sight does not appear to hold for llalian, which allows the equivalent of
(l2a), but not (la):
i.
Gianni ha alzato la mano.
ii
'Gianni ha paura eli lui.
Gianni has lifted the hand
Gianni has fright of him.

https://scholarworks.umass.edu/nels/vol29/iss1/22
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natural in view of the tight crosslinguistic connection between the syntax of anaphors and
that of Inalienable Possession: in many languages, the syntax of Inalienable Possession
appears to be a diachronic 'source' of anaphors; put differently, anaphors quite frequently
originate as body parts (Faltz 1977, Pica 1988, Postma 1997).
We are now in a position formulate an answer to the question raised in (2a)
regarding the contrast between French lui and English him in (11). French lui can be
'anaphorized' in (lla) for the same reason definite DPs can be interpreted as Inalienable
DPs in similar syntactic contexts. The DP lui in (1la) is 'anaphorized' by the same
mechanism that turns Ie doigt 'the finger' in (12a) and la tete 'the head' in (13a) into
inalienably possessed DPs. Since, for reasons that are unclear to us, the mechanism of
anaphorization, C.q. inalienabilization, is limited to certain locative PP contexts in
English, it cannot apply to the nonJocative context in (lIb).
This analysis is corroborated by morphological evidence: French lui can be
decomposed morphologically into the definite DO Ie 'the' and the bound N° morpheme ui that also occurs in autrui 'the other'. The structure of lui and autrui then is as in (15)
(Rooryck 1998):
(15)

lui 'him/het'
autrui 'the other (person),

=

[00 Ie 1 'the' + [w -ui 1 'person'
[A autre 1'other' + [w -ui 1 'person'
0

This morphological analysis constitutes a furher argument in favor of the identity of the
mechanisms of'anaphorization' of the pronoun lui in (1la) and 'inalienabilization' of the
definite DPs in (12a-13a): in both cases, the definite DO expresses co-interpretation with
the antecedent. For English, the claim that pronouns are morphologically complex would
be much harder to maintain.
Admittedly, our explanation of the contrast between locative and nonlocative PP
contexts in French and English is not complete: it is not clear why English limits the
'Gianni lifted his band'
'Gianni is ashamed of himself.'
However, it appears that properties of inalienable possession are somewhat different in Italian as compared
to French. Thus in French the syntax of inalienable possession is restricted to body-parts, whereas in Italian
it extends to other types of possessive relations.
iii.
Gianni ha perso,oricevuto il portafogliolla macchina.
iv.
°Jean a perdul~ Ie portefeuillella voirure.
John has lost/received the wallet/the car
'John lost/received his walletlhis car:
The contrast in (iii) with respect to the choice of the verb suggests that some weaker notion of 'previous
possession' is relevant, instead of the more restricted one of inalienable possession. Portuguese is like
Italian in this respect, while Spanish patterns with French. There thus seems to be a complementary
distribution between anaphorization of pronouns! no previous possession (French) and expression of
previous possession! no anaphorization of pronouns (Italian). In our view, both anaphorization and
inalienabilization are about spatio-temporal relations. In the case of inaIienable nouns (e.g. (i), the relation
with the antecedent is interpreted as a spatial one, and the temporal dimension is irrelevant In the case of
pronouns (la) and alienable NPs (iii), the relation with the antecedent is interpreted as a temporal one, and
the spatial dimension is irrelevant This temporal relation can now be interpreted in one of two ways: either
its domain is that of time-slices, as with animate OPs, or it is not (inanimate DPs). In case the temporal
relation is interpreted over time-slices, the situation attested in French obtains: pronouns are interpreted as
'previous' time-slices of the antecedent, and definite DPs without time-slices such as Ie porteJeuille cannot
be interpreted (cf. (iv». lf the temporal relation with the definite OP is not interpretable in tenns of timeslices, as with inanimate OPs, pronouns will not be interpreted. This is the case in Italian: the relationship
of previous ownership is the only temporal relationship that can obtain between the definite DP and the
possessor-antecedent (cf. (iii».
Published by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst, 1999
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syntax of Inalienable Possession to locative PPs as in (lIb) and (l4b). We have,
however, found an answer to question (2a) as to why French lui, but not English him, can
have a local antecedent: French exploits the syntax of inalienable possession to
'anaphorize' the pronoun in (lla) in a syntactic context where English cannot do so.
We still have to explain the semantics of French lui, i.e. why lui can refer to a
'previous' s·elfin PP contexts such as (I a) and (1Ia). We would like to propose an answer
along the lines of our general assumptions concerning the linguistic representation of
animate DPs. Syntactically, lui functions as a body-part, i.e. it is in a configuration of
inalienable possession where Victor is the possessor. However, semantically, lui is an
animate DP, so that it should be viewed as a set of time-slices. That is, in contrast to other
body parts, which are spatial objects, lui should be seen as a body part with an essentially
temporal interpretation. This yields a reading in which the set of time-slices representing
the DP lui is inalienably possessed by the DP Victor, itself also to be considered as a set
of time-slices. The syntax of inalienable possession forces an interpretation at t1}e
Interface involving a superset-subset relation between the time-slice sets of the possessor
Victor and the possessed DP lui. Subsets of slices are naturally interpreted as different
selves. In English, such 'partial selves' are often expressed by locutions such as 'his
former self, 'his political self, 'my better self, etc. Similarly, anaphorized lui, being a
subset of slices, is interpreted as 'part of the self of the antecedent-superset Victor. Put
differently, lui has to be considered a 'partial' self that is interpretively underspecified.
This means that the anaphorized pronoun receives a specific interpretation as a 'partial'
self, with the exact specification of this partial self depending on the context. In (Ia), the
anaphorized pronoun only refers to a temporal subset, interpreted most naturally as the
previous self This interpretation for anaphorized pronouns as involving a past or
previous elf is not the only possible one, however. In the following examples, all from
Zribi-Hertz (1980), anaphorized pronouns refer to a variety of 'partial selves', the
specification of which is determined by the syntactic context, as indicated:
(16) a Victor votera pour lui.
(political self)
'Victor will vote for himself'
b Victor a acheh~ ya pour lui
(future self)
'Victor bought that for himself'
(past self)
(17) a Victor regarde une photo de lui.
'Victor looks at a photograph of himself'
b Victor est hors de lui.
(his usual self)
'Victor is beside himself (with anger).'
(his conscious self)
c Victor est revenu it lui.
Victor came back to him(self)
'Victor regained consciousness.'
d Victor reflechissait it part lui.
(his public/social self)
Victor reflected apart from himself
'Victor reflected on his own.'
(18) a Victor a dormi chez lui.
(chez lean = Jean's residence)
'Victor slept at his place.'
(chez lui = residence of physical self)
b Victor a mis la soupiere devant lui.
(physical self)
'Victor put the terrine in front of him. '
(physical self)
c Victor tire la couverture a lui.
'Victor draws the blanket towards him.'
d Victor prend Ie livre avec lui.
(physical self)
'Victor takes the book with him.'
The answer to questions (2a) and (2b) thus appear to be strongly intertwined. The range
of interpretations for 'anaphorized' pronouns such as lui is restricted by the syntax of
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/nels/vol29/iss1/22
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Inalienable Possession. The syntax of Inalienable Possession appears to be operative in
syntactic contexts in French that are unavailable in English, with corresponding
consequences for 'anaphorization' of pronouns.

5.

Complex reflexives

Let us now tum our attention to complex reflexives in French and Dutch. Before
going into an explanation of the range of interpretations these complex reflexives receive
in both languages, we briefly recapitulate the analysis of the syntactic and semantic
representation of the Focus-markers zelj and meme that are a morphological part of
complex reflexives (see Rooryck & Vanden Wyngaerd 1998a for details and examples).
Moravcsik (1972) and Levinson (1991) note that crosslinguistically, there is a strong
morphosyntactic correlation between Focus-markers and complex reflexives. We propose
that zelj and meme also function as Focus-markers when they are part of the complex
reflexive. In line with our general tenet that morphological complexity correlates with
semantic complexity, we argue that the Focus-markers within complex reflexives are
responsible for the various interpretations noted in (4) above and the examples
corresponding to it.

5.1

Zelf/meme as Focus markers

Morphologically, the complex anaphors zichze/f and lui-meme consist of the
anaphor zich or the pronoun lui, and an element zelf/meme which function as Focusmarkers in the same way as English himseljin (19c). Comparing the three languages, we
propose the syntactic structures in (20) for the Focus-markers zeljllui-memelhimselj in
(19).
(19) a
b
c
(20) a
b
c

[Jean lui-meme]
[Jan zelf]
[John himself]
lMemeP [Dp Jean]
[np Jan]
[zelfP
[DP John]
[SelfP

fait la vaisselle
doet de afwas
does the dishes
[[Meme lui-meme] tlui II
[[zelf' pro-zelf]
tpro ]]
thim ]]
[[Self' himself]
Q

There are several respects in which focus-related zeljllui-memelhimselj resemble focus
markers such as alleen/only. For example, both aileen/only and. zeljlhimselj resist
modifying indefinite DPs (cf. Moravcsik 1972). Also, both aileen/only and zeljlhimselj
semantically involve a notion of scalarity with respect to the expectations of the speaker
(Edmondson & Planck 1978). The example (21a) presupposes a hierarchical ranking
within a set of people with the headmaster higher on the scale than the assistant. Only
expresses the fact that the person who received you is lower on the scale than the one you
expected. By contrast, himseljin (21b) expresses the fact that the person receiving you is
higher on the scale than the one you expected.
(21) a Did you see the headmaster? -- No, only the assistant received me.
b r went to school today and guess what: the headmaster himself received me.
Th.e analysis we shall propose for the focus marker (him)selj is modelled on the analysis
proposed for only by Bonomi & Casalegno (1994) and Szabolsci (1994); this analysis is
framed in terms of exhaustive identification of sets of events, as in (22):
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(22) a Only John did the dishes.
b Only-Focus as exhaustive identification of sets of events:
'Every event ofx doing the dishes is identified with an event
where John did the dishes.'
The exclusion effect present in the interpretation of (22a) ('John, and not the others who
were also expected to do the dishes') is derived as a matter of pragmatic implicature, i.e.
exhaustive identification of sets in (22b) yields exclusion of the (expected) complement
set.
Let us now compare a case of only-focus and a case of zeif-focus. In (23a), only
requires a focus-set of several dish washing events involving several people who might
each do their own dishes. The fact that only John did the dishes is less than expected. In
(23 b), there is a single dishwashing event involving several expected dishwashers, and
the fact that John did the dishes was more than expected.
(23) a Only John did the dishes.
b John himself did the dishes.

(several dishwashing events)
(several dishwashers)

That is, the difference between focus-markers aileen/only on the one hand, and
zeiflhimseif on the other, al so involves a difference in scope: over events in the case of
only and over DPs in the case of zelj Expressing this insight about the focal scope of zeif
in terms of exhaustive identification of sets of DPs, we arrive at the following
characterization of zeif-focus.
(24)

Zeiflmeme-Focus as exhaustive identification of sets ofDPs:
'Every x doing the dishes is identified (via the identifier zeifllui-meme) with
John'
'<:Ix, x do the dishes, x=John

Again, exhaustive identification yields pragmatic exclusion of the expected complement
set: the interpretation 'John did the dishes, and not the expected people lower on the
scale' for (23b).
The syntactic structure proposed in (20) reflects the semantic interpretation. In the
structures proposed, the pronominal complement of zeiflmeme, (lui/pro/him), ranges over
the set of people that the event can be predicated of. The syntactic configuration encodes
the semantic identification of the range of people (Every x doing the dishes) with John.
This identification is realized through agreement. Since zeif does not bear morphological
markers for person, gender, and number, it cannot check the cp--features of its Spec. In
order to achieve agreement with Jan in SpecZelf-P, pro adjoins to zeif in Dutch. pro is
overtly realized in English himself, French lui-me me, where the pronouns do display
person, number, and gender agreement with the DP in [Spec,Zelf']
5.2

Zelj!meme as Focus markers in complex reflexives

The syntactic and semantic analysis of zeifllui-meme as a Focus-marker can now
be applied to the complex anaphoric expressions zichzeif and its French counterpart se ...
lui-meme exemplified in (25), involving the configuration (26). The only difference with
the configuration in (20) is that the reflexive is in the specifier position of ZelfIMemeP.
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We assume that the zichlse part of the complex reflexive moves either covertly (zich) or
overtly (se) to the matrix T" in order to establish a checking relation with the subject. 3
(25) a Jean beschouwt zichzelfals de beste kandidaat.
b Jean se considere lui-meme comme Ie meilJeur candidat.
'John considers himself the best candidate.'
(26) a Jean ~ beschouwt [ze1fP zich [[Zelf" pro zeit] 1*6]] als de beste kandidaat.
b Jean se considere [MrnP se [[Mrn° lui-meme] Itti]] comme Ie m. candidat.
The interpretation of zichzelj and se... lui-meme now is a two step procedure, involving,
first, the interpretation of zichlse and, second, the interpretation of zeljllui-meme. Both
interpretive processes exist independently, but their combination yields a more complex
interpretation, in line with our earlier maxim that syntactic complexity is mirrored by
semantic complexity. The interpretation of zichlse involves relating zichlse to the timeslices of the DP antecedent Jean: the Spec-head relation between Jean and zichlse
ensures that the zichlse-slice is interpreted as a slice of Jean. Secondly, the interpretation
of zeljllui-meme involves the operation of Focus (exhaustive identification) applied to
zichlse, in exactly the same way as in (24) above:
(27)

Zeljlmeme Focus as exhaustive identiftcation oftime-slices (zichlse):
• 'Every x such that Jean considers x the best candidate is identifted with zichlse'
• '<:Ix, x a time-slice such that Jean x-considers the best candidate, x=a Jean-slice

The combined effect of the semantic operation of exhaustive identification within the
syntactic configuration (26) is that any potential time-slice zichlse is identified with a
time-slice of Jean; this operation creates a set of Jean-slices. This set of time-slices
created by the operation of exhaustive identification receives a natural interpretation as a
'dissociated' self (e.g. (3) and (4) above). Such a 'dissociated' self reading may include
an interpretation as a former (past) self. However, an interpretation as a present or
simultaneous self in the manner of zich is excluded, since the interpretation as a
simultaneous self requires a single time-slice tT. This explains the interpretive effects
displayed by zichzeljand se... lui-meme noted in (3) and (4) and similar examples.
The interpretation of lui-meme differs minimally from that of se... lui-meme. We
propose that the syntactic configuration of lui-meme in (lc), repeated here, is as in (28):
(I) c Victor a honte de lui-meme
(28) Victor a honte de [MemeP lui [[Memeo pro-meme] tpro ]]
'Victor is ashamed of himself.'
In this structure, lui does not originate in the complement of meme as in (20a) and (26b),
but rather is generated in SpecMemeP, as the DP Jean in Jean lui-meme (20a) and the
reflexive clitic se in se... Iui-meme (26b). Again, the interpretation of lui-meme is a
procedure involving two steps. The interpretation of lui requires relating lui to its
antecedent Jean. This is done in (lc) in essentially the same way as in the simpler case
(la) Victor a honte de lui: both sentences share the same PP configuration, so that the
syntax of inalienab Ie possession can relate lui in lui pro-meme to Victor in the same way
as in Victor a honte de lui (cf. section 2). In both cases, lui is a set of time-slices standing
in a subset relationship with respect to the time-slices making up Victor.

3The analysis presented here differs somewhat from the one presented in Rooryck & Vanden Wyngaerd
(1998a). See Rooryck & Vanden Wyngaerd (1998b) for a discussion and motivation of the complex
reflexive se... lui-meme in French.
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The interpretation of pro-meme in (lc) involves a Focus operation of exhaustive
identification applied to lui, i.e. applied to subsets of time-slices:
(29)

Meme Focus as exhaustive identification of subsets of time-slices (lui)
• 'Every x such that Victor is ashamed ofx is identified with lui'
• 'ifx., x a set of time-slices such that Victor is ashamed ofx., x=lui, with lui a subset
of the Victor-set

The effect of (29) can be described as follows. Any potential subset of time-slices (or
'self) which Victor is ashamed of, is identified as a Victor subset, or Victor-'self. This
operation creates a set of Victor-subsets or Victor-selves. This set of selves can be
interpreted as a 'dissociated entire self as in (5), repeated here:
(5) a Sophie a reconcilie Victor avec lui-memel*lui.
(dissociated entire self)
'Sophie has reconciled Victor with/distanced Victor from himself.'
b Victor bavarde avec/s'acharne contre lui-memel*lui. (dissociated entire self)
'Victor talks to/fights against himself.'
Differently from zichzelJ and se..lui-meme, however, the interpretation of lui-meme does
not exclude an interpretation as the present self, as in (Ic). This is because the singleton
set comprising the time-slice tT (i.e. Victor's present self) is included in the set of subsets
created by the operation of exhausive identification over subsets of slices. As a result, the
anaphoric relation between lui-meme and Victor can be interpreted with the simultaneous
interpretation of lui-meme in (Ic) Jean a honte de lui-meme, as opposed to the 'past self
interpretation of lui in (I a) Victor a honte de lui.
Additional evidence that the analysis of lui-meme involves a set of subsets of
slices, i.e. an 'entire dissociated' self, comes from contexts in which the anaphoric
relation requires an interpretation as a 'partial' subset of slices rather than as an 'entire
dissociated' self. The sentences cited above in (16-18) constitute such contexts: ZribiHertz (1980) has observed that in these specific cases involving anaphoric lUi, anaphoric
lui-meme is excluded. In the analysis advocated here, this exclusion must be attributed to
the fact that the interpretation of the sentence requires the anaphor to be interpreted as a
single subset of time-slices, i.e. a 'partial' self:
(16) a Victor votera pour lui(*-meme).
'Victor will vote for himself.'
b Victor a achete ya pour lui(*-meme)
'Victor bought that for himself.'
(17) a Victor regarde une photo de lui(*-meme).
'Victor looks at a photograph of himself.'
b Victor est hors de lui(*-meme).
'Victor is beside himself (with anger).'
c Victor est revenu it lui(*-meme).
Victor came back to him(self)
'Victor regained consciousness.'
d Victor reflechissait it part lui.
Victor reflected apart from himself
(18)a Victor a dormi chez lui(*-meme).
'Victor slept at his place.'

https://scholarworks.umass.edu/nels/vol29/iss1/22
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b Victor a mis la soupiere devant lui(*-meme) (only physical self)
'Victor put the tenine in front of him. '
c Victor tire la couverture II lui(*-meme).
(only physical self)
'Victor draws the blanket towards him.'
d Victor prend Ie livre avec lui(*-meme).
(only physical self)
'Victor takes the book with him.'

5.3

The interpretation of 'emphatic' lui-meme

Zribi-Hertz (1980) in fact distinguishes two types of lui-meme: one is the lui-meme which
has been discussed above, the other is an emphatic or contrastive lui-meme, noted LUIMEME by Zribi-Hertz. She observes that the latter can occur in environments in which
the former cannot.
(30)

Victor. votera pour *luij-memeILUIj-MEME.

We believe this is not really a different lui-meme from the one we have discussed. It
behaves differently, however, because of the contrastive environment it is used in. This
effect can be observed independently, as in the following dialogue:
(31)

- Does Max like Victor?
- No VICTOR likes Victor.

We find that the effect of contrastive stress can override that of Condition C (see also
Evans 1980, Reinhart 1983, Tancredi 1994, 1995, Horvath and Rochemont 1986). The
same is possible with condition B violations.
(32)

- (talking about Victor) Does Max like him?
- No, but VICTORj likes himj.

In the same way, the normal interpretive procedure applying to (30) can be suspended
and an otherwise impossible form can appear if contrastive stress is present. This ,linalysis
receives some confirmation from a number of contexts where contrastive LUI-MEME is
ruled out:
(33) a Victor reflechissait II part luil*LUI-1>ffiME.
'Victor reflected on his own.'
b Victor tire la couverture II luil*LUI-~.
'Victor draws the blanket towards him:
eVictor prend Ie livre avec lui/*LUI-MEME.
'Victor takes the book with him.'
d Victor a toute l'equipe avec luil*LUI-MEME.
'Victor has the whole team on his side.'
e Victor est hors de luil*LUI-MEME.
'Victor is beside himself(with anger).'
The reason why LUI-MEME is ruled out here is that contrastive stress is ruled out
independently. This is in tum due to the fact that contrastive stress requires the
consideration of a set of possible alternatives: if! say that John read the BOOK, this calls
up a set of alternative items of reading which John did not read but might have been
expected to read. In the examples of(33), no such set of alternatives is available, because
they require an anaphoric link between the pronoun and the subject. In other words, the
prono~n cannot be replaced by a name. This suggests that the anaphoric link that is
Sometimes possible with a contrastively stressed lui-meme is intimately tied to the
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presence of contrastive stress itself; and not due to some difference in the internal makeup of the complex form itself
6.

Conclusion

In this paper, we have argued that the lexical 'atoms' of anaphora include
morphemes expressing time-slices (zich/se) or sets of time-slices (luilhim) and Focusmarkers (meme/zelJ).
Semantically, anaphora is construed via the syntactic combination of atoms. The
anaphorization of pronouns such as lui proceeds through the syntax of inalienable
possession. The anaphoric interpretation of the complex reflexive lui-meme combines the
syntax of inalienable possession (lui) and the Focus-marker meme. The anaphoric
interpretation of the complex reflexive zichzelj combines time-slice zich/se (moving to
P) and the Focus-marker (zelJ). The morphological and syntactic complexity of anaphors
is mirrored by their semantic complexity.
We have argued that Binding takes place at the Interface. The relation between
anaphors and antecedents involves the intersection of time-slices. The exact interpretation
of this intersection is a function of the syntactic configuration involved. Variation in the
combination of 'atoms' of anaph ora yields various forms ofidentity at the Interface.
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